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Abstract—We present a method for obtaining a useful sym-
bolic model of persuasion in a complex game, where players’
preferences over the outcomes of negotiations over resources are
incomplete, uncertain, and dynamic. We focus on the problem of
identifying the stage in the game where successfully persuading
an agent to perform a particular action will have the most impact
on one’s chances to win. Our approach exploits empirical data
from game simulations, where the set up allows us to investigate
individual aspects of the policy in suitably controlled ways. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach within the domain
of The Settlers of Catan and present some specific lessons that
can be learned for this particular game, e.g. that a tipping point
in the game occurs for persuasion moves that are made when the
leading player reaches 7 Victory Points.
I. INTRODUCTION
Strategic negotiation is a type of non-cooperative conver-
sation, which the Gricean view of cognitive agents doesn’t
account for [1]. Within game theory, standard models of ne-
gotiation assume that each player’s (intrinsic) preferences over
the negotiation’s outcomes are static, complete and predefined
(e.g., [2]). A player can be uncertain about his opponent’s
preferences over the outcomes, but the preferences themselves
don’t change. Thus models of persuasion have until now
focussed entirely on the speaker revealing information about
the current state so as to manipulate his opponents’ beliefs
about which negotiation outcomes are likely (e.g., [3]). For
instance, in a trading negotiation, the receiver of an offer to
exchange wheat for clay might declare he has no wheat, and
indeed be lying, so as to persuade his opponent to accept his
counteroffer, of rock for clay.
But what if persuasion happens in an extensive game where
trading is a small fraction of the overall action sequence?
Further, what if the game is so complex that no player can be
certain about even his own preferences over the next trade?
Such scenarios fail to meet the informational demands of
the definition of a standard negotiation game: preferences
over trades are no longer static, complete or predefined.
Thus standard models of persuasion don’t apply on their own
either. But intuitively, the stakes of persuasion are higher: on
the one hand one can now persuade a player to revise his
preferences over trades, and not just his beliefs about which
trades are likely; on the other hand, a persuading agent risks
inadvertently persuading opponents to behave in ways that
hurt him. A further risk arises in a time critical situation.
Calculating whether a persuasion move will have its desired
immediate effect—i.e., changing the receiver’s behaviour—is
computationally (or cognitively) expensive [3]. But if other
negotiating players can make improved trade offers at any time
in the negotiation, then the time taken to identify a convincing
persuasive move may backfire.
Persuasion in such complex scenarios is commonplace:
while ongoing business transactions between large commercial
organisations are often modelled as some form of Markov
Decision Process, in reality the game tree isn’t surveyable: e.g.,
a player may make an offer that his opponent didn’t foresee
as a possible move in the game. Similarly, in board games like
Diplomacy or The Settlers of Catan (or Settlers, the game we
investigate here), the game is complex and includes unbounded
options for trading (thanks to, for instance, the capacity to
promise a specific future trade; e.g., If you trade clay for wheat
now, I’ll give you rock when I get it). So standard algorithms
for computing (extrinsic) preferences over the outcomes of
the current negotiation, such as backwards induction and its
variants [4], break down [5].
What’s needed for modelling persuasion in these complex
games is a general method for exploring its benefits and risks
that doesn’t require the information demanded by standard
negotiation games, such as complete and static preferences
over the negotiation’s outcomes. We explore one such general
approach here, grounded in empirical data. Specifically, we
provide a proof by demonstration that one can rapidly design,
test and adapt symbolic persuasion strategies, with adaptation
being guided by game simulations, whereby we achieve a rapid
improvement in the agent’s ability to win the game.
We focus here on a particular issue: at what stage in the
game would performing a successful persuasion, such as we
find in a corpus of people playing the game [8], yield the
most radical improvement to one’s chances of winning? This
is a critical question, given the above risks in performing
complex calculations to identify a convincing persuasion move.
In effect, we offer an empirical method to identify the upper
bound on the benefits of persuasion in a complex game.
In trade negotiations, the persuading agent aims for either:
1) More Trades: i.e., a desired trade he might not
achieve otherwise (e.g., But if you accept this trade,
you’ll get clay and be able to build a road); or
2) Fewer Opponent Trades: i.e., he stops two oppo-
nents from trading with each other (e.g., Don’t trade
with him! He’s about to win!)
Our objective is to identify empirically the stage in the game
when a successful persuasion of both these types results in the
biggest increase to one’s chances of winning the overall game.
We use game simulations in which 4 agents play Settlers,
with one player’s persuasion strategy being different from the
other three. We vary the context in which the persuading agent
decides to make a persuading move, and vary also whether
his persuasion move aims for the outcome MT (More Trades
for himself) or FOT (Fewer Opponent Trades). Of course,
these outcomes are desirable only if the agent’s policies on
trading ensure that winning correlates with how many trades
he executes (and likewise inversely correlates with how many
trades his opponents perform). In earlier work, we showed
these correlations hold for our agents [6], [7]. Here, we aim to
identify which negotiation within a sequence of negotiations
(and other actions) is the most critical for gaining an overall
advantage in the game.
Because we are investigating at what point in a game a
successful persuasion move would reap the most reward, we
ignore the complex issue of whether the persuasion move is
going to have the desired immediate outcome: i.e., whether the
intention to revise the opponents’ behaviours gets realised. So
in our experiments, we make the 3 ‘baseline’ agents against
which the persuading agent plays maximally gullible: they
are always persuaded. In [9] we report on simulations where
the baseline agents are more selective about when they are
persuaded; likewise, the persuading agent is endowed with
a more restricted range of persuasive arguments that he can
deploy, and so they’re appropriate in only a restricted set of
contexts. But in this paper, the only real choice (and risk) the
persuading agent deliberates on is the optimal timing in the
course of the game of a successful persuasion move.
After discussing related work in section II, we describe the
rules of Settlers in section III and the implemented agents and
their strategies in section IV. In the remainder of the paper
we then present our experiments, in which we manipulate the
timing and type of persuasion move that an agent performs,
and we provide quantitative metrics of the effects of these
different behaviours in terms of win rates, the number of
trades agents achieve, the number of resources they receive
via trading, and also the number of opportunities that an agent
had to actually choose a persuasion move, given his policies
for when to perform it. Given that our experiments radically
discriminate among the performances of agents with different
persuasion strategies, this work is a proof by demonstration
that one can rapidly design effective heuristics of game play,
in an empirical and principled fashion, for complex games
where standard algorithms for computing optimal action all
break down.
II. RELATED WORK
Game theory as it applies to negotiation is well studied
(e.g., [2], [10], [11]), with researchers observing when and
how one can suffer from the ‘winner’s curse’ (i.e., overpaying
for an item, given the opponents preferences) and when and
how situations analogous to the prisoner’s dilemma occur (i.e.,
can one player trust the other to voluntarily cooperate during
negotiation). In almost all these studies, the negotiation is a
‘one off’ game: they assume that each player has a complete
and static model of his own preferences over the end states of
the negotiation. This restricts the scope of what persuasion
can achieve: one cannot persuade an opponent that he has
the wrong intrinsic preferences, only that his beliefs about the
current state and/or the outcome of actions need revising.
Existing game-theoretic models of persuasion (e.g., [12])
assume that the persuading agent can access information about
the current state that his opponents can’t, and moreover he
has complete information about his own utility of a successful
outcome of his persuasion move (i.e., the outcome where
the opponent is persuaded to change his behaviour in the
way the persuading agent intended). This is largely because
this work focusses on predictive models of the credibility of
the information declared in the persuasion. In contrast, we
address a different problem: in a game where the benefit of
a successful persuasion is uncertain, how can one weigh the
risk of expounding effort to identify a convincing persuasion
against its potential benefit? And in particular, at what stage
in the game is a successful persuasion most likely to reap the
most reward? We propose an empirical method for answering
this question. Our study uses Settlers as a domain in which
players cannot accurately calculate the utility of successfully
persuading when they make their persuasive move.
There are several empirical approaches to modelling Set-
tlers, but none of them includes trading or negotiating. Specifi-
cally, [13] and [14] use Monte Carlo Tree Search and [15] uses
reinforcement learning. In addition to using simplified versions
of the game problem, both approaches also demonstrate that a
decent prior model is critical to the learning process being
successful. They all use as a starting point players with
already sophisticated strategies, defined via complex hand-
coded heuristics. This paper contributes to the general problem
of developing decent priors that make learning improved
strategies over complex games a possibility, by supplying an
empirical framework where hand-coded heuristics for playing
the game can be rapidly designed and improved in light of their
effects on game performance. In [6] we used this framework to
identify which negotiation strategies in Settlers can compensate
for deficiencies in belief, e.g., via memory loss, and in [7]
we used it to improve the preference function over building
options. Here, we use it to identify the point in the game where
a successful persuasion move will have the most beneficial
impact on trading and winning.
III. THE SETTLERS OF CATAN
Our example domain for investigating persuasion is the
board game The Settlers of Catan (or Settlers, [16]; see
www.catan.com). This game exhibits maximum complexity:
it is multi-player, partially observable, non-deterministic and
dynamic (thanks to dice rolls); and further, with negotiations
being conducted in natural language, the game’s options are
unbounded (see earlier discussion). This complexity makes
Settlers an ideal domain for our purposes, with prior work
showing that learning policies for playing Settlers are feasible
only if the learning process starts with a very decent prior
strategy [13], [14]. The work we report here is a proof by
demonstration that one can rapidly design and evaluate such
prior models in a principled and empirically grounded way.
Settlers is a win–lose board game for 2 to 4 players. Each
player acquires resources (ore, wood, wheat, clay, sheep) and
Fig. 1. A game of The Settlers of Catan in JSettlers.
uses them in different combinations to build roads, settlements
and cities on a board like the one shown in Figure 1. This earns
Victory Points (VPs); the first player with 10 VPs wins. Players
can acquire resources via the dice roll that starts each turn
and through trading with other players—so players converse
to negotiate trades. A player’s decisions about what resources
to trade depends on what he wants to build; e.g., a road requires
1 clay and 1 wood. Trading decisions are also determined
by estimates of what will most advance, or undermine, the
opponents’ strategies [17]. Players are free to agree any trade
(any quantity or combination) with the exception of just giving
resources away. Trades can also be linked to other game actions
(Make this trade with me, and I won’t rob you for 2 rounds).
Players can also lose resources: e.g., a player who rolls a 7 can
rob from another player. What’s robbed is hidden from view,
so players lack complete information about their opponents’
resources. Because Settlers is a game of imperfect information,
agents can, and frequently do, engage in ‘futile’ negotiations
that result in no trade (i.e., they miscalculate the equilibria).
IV. PLANNING AND NEGOTIATION IN JSETTLERS
We build on an open source implementation called
JSettlers (jsettlers2.sourceforge.net, [17]).
JSettlers is a client–server system: a server maintains the
game state and passes messages between the players’ clients,
which can run on different computers. Clients can be human
players or computer agents, cf. also [6]–[8]. Here, we report
on simulations between computer agents only.
The JSettlers agent goes through multiple phases after
the dice roll that starts his turn:
1) Deal with game events: e.g. placing the robber;
acquiring or discarding resources.
2) Determine legal and potential places to build.
3) Estimate the time required to build pieces on legal
places (the ETB).
4) Compute the Best Build Plan (BBP): a sequence of
build actions that achieves 10 VPs in the shortest
estimated time (ignoring how opponents might hinder
your plans).
5) Try to execute the BBP, including negotiating and
trading with other players.
As we are exploring an aspect of negotiation, all our agents
adopt the same policy for doing steps 1–4, while different
agents adopt different policies for doing step 5. [6] and [17]
describe the policy for steps 1–4 in detail, but for the purposes
of this paper the issues of when, how and why an agent decides
that trading is its best available action are not important. For
our purposes, what matters is that the existing implemented
policy on trading is effective, in that on average, trading
correlates with winning. In [6] we show this is the case for all
our agents.
In this paper, we explore the effects of persuasion by
varying step 5. All our agents have three existing possible
responses to a trade offer: accept, reject or counteroffer. We
equip our persuading agent with three more responses:
1) Issue a trade embargo against a player (as might
result from Don’t trade with him, he’s about to win);
an embargoed player will not be able to make any
trades,
2) Block for a specified number of turns the offering
agent from making both the specific trade that he’s
just offered and any trade where he receives the
receivable resource in that offer (Don’t give him
ore, because then he’ll build a city and we’re all
doomed); thus, this is more targeted than a blanket
trade embargo,
3) Issue a force-accept move, that compels the receiver
to accept and enact the persuading agent’s trade offer
(this is the outcome of successfully persuading the
receiver to accept the offer).
The first two moves are of type FOT and the last is of type
MT. In our experiments, the strategies for deciding among this
expanded set of actions vary.
The JSettlers heuristics already include an FOT type
strategy via a trade embargo against players who are believed
to be close to winning: i.e., an agent won’t trade with a player
who has 8 or more VPs or whose Estimated Time to Win
(ETW) is below a set threshold. We disabled this behaviour
here in order to avoid any interferences with the issues we are
testing. Further, as our experimental results suggest, imposing
a trade embargo on the leader when he reaches 8 VPs isn’t
effective—it is too late in the game in that the leader is so
close to winning that the embargo has insufficient influence
on the final outcome.
Since we are testing the upper bound on effectiveness of
persuasion moves in various contexts in the game, we start
with some unrealistic assumptions about how persuasive an
agent can be and then reduce the number of persuasion moves
the agent can make and limit the length of time the FOT type
of moves are in effect. In this way, we identify the contexts
where it is most likely they will have an advantageous effect.
V. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD
A simulation for testing the different persuasion moves
consisted of 1 persuading agent playing 3 baseline agents in
10,000 games. So the null hypothesis is that each agent wins
25% of these 10,000 games. To carry out these simulations,
we created a simulation environment for JSettlers. The
server and the 4 agents all ran on the same machine. Running
10,000 games takes about 1h on a current desktop computer.
We investigate persuasion by varying 4 parameters:
1) The type of move (embargo, block, force-accept),
2) The number of times an agent can execute that move
(modelling how persuasive the agent is in the sense
that we vary the number of persuasion arguments he
can produce),
3) The number of VPs the leader has when the persuader
starts making persuasion moves (modelling when in
the course of a game these moves are most effective),
4) The number of turns that an embargo or blocking
move has an effect (modelling how persuasive the
agent is via the stability of the coalition against the
embargoed or blocked agent).
In addition to measuring the win rate, we studied the
agents’ negotiating and trading behaviour by analysing the total
number of trades they made and the number of resources they
received by making trades. We will also report the number
of persuasion moves they executed. Observe that the number
of persuasion moves the agent actually makes is a dependent
variable on all of the above parameters: this could be fewer
than the number he can make.
We performed Z-tests to test significance of win rates
against the null hypothesis and analysed number of trades and
resources received via paired t-tests for all combinations of
opponents. We used a significance threshold of p < 0.01 (when
reporting a result as significant we will omit the p-value). This
roughly means that win rates between 0.24 and 0.26 do not
differ significantly from the null-hypothesis, which is why we
highlight these values in the graphs below.
We report the average numbers for the persuading agent
in the 10,000 simulations, and the average numbers across
all three baseline agents in 10,000 simulations. Due to the
large number of games per simulation even small differences
can be significant. At the same time, there were no significant
differences between the three instances of the baseline agent,
i.e. all differences result from agent modifications.
We use as our baseline agent the one that’s called ranking
in [7], because (i) it substantially improves over the agent that
comes with the JSettlers system and (ii) it provides an
easier and cleaner implementation of the game-play strategy.
VI. FEWER OPPONENT TRADES I – TRADE EMBARGOES
We start with the persuading agent persuading two of his
opponents to enact a trade embargo against the third opponent,
and we vary the parameters given above. As already men-
tioned, the two opponents always comply with this persuasion
move. In the simulations, we restrict ourselves to games where
at most one trade embargo can be in effect at any given time.
This not only avoids the added complexity of deciding on
several embargoes simultaneously, but also having only one
potential trading partner can hurt the persuading agent (recall
the correlation between trading and winning).
Fig. 2. Effect of how far the game has progressed when an embargo against
the leading baseline player is enacted on the win rate of the persuading agent.
We are looking for the point in the game when it is most
advantageous for a player to identify a player to embargo and
initiate that embargo. Intuitively, blocking the leader when he
is already close to winning may be ineffective because he is
still likely to win even if he can’t trade. On the other hand,
blocking a player early on has a higher chance of targeting
someone who is not a contender for winning anyway.
A. Issuing a permanent embargo against one player
The simplest embargo strategy is that the persuading agent
issues just one embargo against one opponent and the embargo
lasts until the end of the game. The simulations showed that
such embargoes are more effective the earlier in the game the
persuading agent can issue them, cf. Figure 2.
Issuing an embargo against a player with only 1 VP es-
sentially amounts to randomly choosing an embargoee at the
start of the game. So, effectively, the game is not played
between 1 persuading and 3 baseline agents but rather between
1 persuading agent, 2 baseline agents and 1 nontrading agent.
As we have shown previously [6], an agent that is not able to
trade is severely handicapped in its ability to win games.
While issuing an embargo when the embargoee only has
1 VP may be most beneficial for the persuading agent, he
will be unlikely to identify an argument that convinces his
opponents to comply. Such arguments would have to speak to
the embargoee’s known, and prior, player type, e.g. Let’s not
trade with him in this game—he always builds to block us.
On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that there is no big
difference to win rates between issuing the embargo when a
leader (or a ‘leading follower’ in those contexts where the
persuading agent is leading) is at 3 VPs vs. 7 VPs, and certainly
at 7 VPs one might convince players to impose embargoes
purely on the basis that somebody is currently close to winning
(i.e., Don’t trade with him, he’s going to win). Note we speak
of a leader not the leader because multiple players can be
in the lead with the same number of VPs, in which case the
persuading agent chooses which leader to embargo randomly.
Figure 2 also shows that while such persuasion tactics may
be more convincing when the leader has 8 or more VPs, they
Fig. 3. Effect of the number of embargoes available to the persuading agent.
A win rate above 0.26 is a significant benefit.
are now ineffective even if the other players comply: a leader
with 8 VPs is likely to win even if he can’t trade. So, don’t wait
too long before attempting this kind of persuasion move! This
is notable because the standard behaviour of the JSettlers
agent is to stop trading with any player who has 8 or more
VPs: our experiments expose this to be suboptimal.
As in the simulations reported in [6], the differences in
win rate are correlated with the number of trades the agent
executes and the number of resources he acquires. Initiating
the embargo at 1 VP means that the baseline agents only make
7.44 trades on average compared to the 11.11 of the persuading
agent (t > 46.5). This results in them receiving only 10.12
resources via trading compared to the 15.05 of the persuader
(t > 45.2). At 8 VPs these differences are not significant any
more (13.93 vs. 14.13 trades, and receiving 18.72 vs. 19.04
resources).
B. Number of embargoes
One of the unrealistic aspects of the above scenario is the
unlimited embargo length. Intuitively, the ‘coalition’ would be
less stable, lasting perhaps only one round (i.e., each player has
one turn during the embargo period; see the next section for
effects of length). Limiting the length enables the persuading
agent to initiate more than one embargo in the course of a
game: this has the potential advantage that the persuading
agent can change who is embargoed when there is a change
in leading position, thereby adapting to the new context.
Again, we explore the question of when in the game
the persuading agent will gain most from initiating these
embargoes. For these simulations, the heuristic on who to
embargo is slightly more realistic in that only a leader (so not
a leading follower when the persuading agent is leading) is
ever embargoed—more realistic in that convincing opponents
to embargo leaders is easier than convincing them to embargo
non-leaders. As before, the persuading agent starts issuing
embargoes when the embargoee is a leader with at least the
specified number of VPs; if the persuading agent is the leader
no embargo is (currently) issued. Embargoes are always issued
at the start of the embargoee’s own turn.
Fig. 4. Number of embargoes enacted depending on how many the persuading
agent has available and on when it starts doing so.
Figure 3 shows the results for different numbers of embar-
goes the persuading agent can issue within a game. To keep
these figures easier to read, we omit simulations for fewer
than 4 VPs when they do not improve the agent’s performance.
Not surprisingly, the more embargoes the persuading can agent
make, the better his chances of winning. None of the agents
significantly improve their win rates if they can issue only 1
embargo, and only the 7 VP agent has a significant advantage
with 2 embargoes available (his win rate is 0.261).
This is also the agent that is doing best, when compared
to the other persuading types while keeping their number of
available embargoes constant. The 5 and 6 VP agents reach his
level of performance but only when they have many embargoes
available. The 8 VP agent fails to significantly improve his
chances of winning games (win rates are all below 0.26).
Two main factors account for these results. The first can
be seen by the performance of the 5 and 6 VP agents with 4
available embargoes: the embargoes don’t hurt a leader with 5
or 6 VPs enough to help the persuading agent to ultimately win
more games. And later on, when a leader has more VPs, the
persuading agent has ‘used up’ his available embargoes! So,
these agents issue their embargoes too early. In comparison,
the 7 VP agent with the same 4 embargoes available (but issued
later) has significantly improved win rates.
The second factor is revealed by the number of embargoes
the persuading agents actually impose as compared with how
many they are allowed to impose, cf. Figure 4: the later in the
game the agent starts issuing embargoes, the fewer embargo
moves it makes; and the 8 VP agent never enacts more than
1.33 embargoes, even when 8 are allowed. Thus 8 VPs is
simply too late in the game: fewer rounds of the game remain
than there are available ‘1-round’ embargoes.
Note that the time when the embargoes are initiated has
a stronger effect on the win rate than the number of (actual)
embargoes: throughout, the 4 VP agent issues more embargoes
than the 7 VP agent, but the 7 VP agent has higher win rates!
With respect to the number of trades and resources re-
ceived, with 1 embargo available none of the agents signifi-
cantly improves his performance. With 8 embargoes available,
the 4 VP agent increases his number of trades to 13.46 on
Fig. 5. Effects of embargo length if number of embargoes is unlimited.
average compared to 12.44 of the baseline agent (t > 14.3)
and his number of received resources to 18.19 compared to
16.78 (t > 14.0). Interestingly, the 7 VP agent has smaller
absolute improvements of the number of trades (13.79 vs.
13.27; t > 7.1) as well as of the number of resources received
(18.65 vs. 17.84; t > 8.0) but still, his win rate is higher! This
is further proof that it is the timing of the moves that is crucial.
C. Embargo Length
Up to now, the embargoes lasted either until the end of
the game or for 4 turns (i.e., 1 round). Figure 5 confirms our
earlier assumption that embargoes are most effective if they last
multiples of rounds. If a leader is allowed to trade for 3 turns
before the persuading agent considers blocking him again, the
persuader benefits considerably less. In these simulations the
persuading agent again has an unlimited number of embargo
moves at his disposal, but the number of embargoes does
not affect the main effect of length, which we confirmed by
running two further batches of simulations in which we limited
the number of embargoes to 2 and 5.
A 4 VP agent whose embargoes last 1 turn does not
achieve significantly more trades or acquire significantly more
resources than his baseline opponents. If the 4 VP agent’s
embargo length is 8 turns, on the other hand, then the differ-
ences are significant: he makes 13.46 trades (vs. 12.44 of the
baseline agents; t > 25.4) and receives 18.19 resources (vs.
16.78; t > 25.7). The differences remain significant even if
the agent doesn’t start instigating his 8-turn embargo until the
leader has 8 VPs, but only just, with 14.11 vs. 13.91 trades
(t > 2.6) and 19.03 vs. 18.70 resources received (t > 2.8).
So, the embargo length directly affects the agents’ chances of
winning.
VII. FEWER OPPONENT TRADES II – BLOCKING TRADES
Rather than completely embargoing an agent, e.g. by the
mentioned He’s about to win!, an agent can also try to stop
a particular kind of trade between two opponents, with an
argument like: If you make that trade with him, he’ll build a
road and block you. ‘Natural’ heuristics for identifying trades
that a persuading agent might choose to block are:
TABLE I. UPPER BOUNDS FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF BLOCKING
MOVES.
blocks resourc.
agent wins tr. offers proposed followed trades by trade
basel. 0.244 23.59 – 4.57 13.00 17.52
heur. 1 0.269 27.77 13.72 – 14.43 19.45
basel. 0.242 26.74 – 4.97 11.92 16.15
heur. 2 0.275 27.66 14.94 – 14.62 19.77
basel. 0.234 22.88 – 10.14 10.55 14.28
heur. 3 0.299 28.60 30.44 – 15.08 20.39
1) Trades where the offer is made by an opponent to
the persuading agent, but he personally doesn’t want
the trade and so decides to block the opponent from
getting his desired trade via any other player, too.
2) Trades where the offer is not made to the persuading
agent.
3) Both 1 and 2, i.e. the persuading agent blocks all
trades between players except those made to him (and
perhaps others too) that he wishes to accept. However,
if another agent also accepts the offer he may not get
the trade.
Blocking moves are made against all players, not just a leader.
The types of situations we are modelling with these block-
ing moves are ones where the persuading agent wants to
prevent an opponent from making a trade that enables a certain
action, such as building a particular piece. For this reason, the
persuading agent is not just blocking one individual trade—
otherwise, the offering agent can gain a similar trade imme-
diately via a slightly modified offer. Rather, the persuading
agent blocks any trade in which the agent gets the receivable
resources in his trade offer for a specified number of turns (one
of our independent variables). For instance, if the trade offer
was to receive wood in exchange for clay, then the persuasion
move blocks any trade where the offering agent receives wood.
Table I shows the results for when the persuading agent
is not restricted by a maximum number of blocking moves or
a minimum number of VPs of a leader. All differences be-
tween baseline and persuading agents are significant. Roughly
speaking, for heuristics 1 and 2 the persuading agent blocks
about 20% of the baseline agents’ trade offers (each of the 3
baseline agents makes on average the listed number of trade
offers), whereas almost half the trade offers get blocked if
the persuading agent adopts heuristic 3. For all heuristics this
leads to significant differences in the number of trades and the
number of resources the agents manage to obtain via trading.
The persuading agent profits more from heuristic 2 than
heuristic 1 but even more if he performs both kinds of moves
(heuristic 3). Considering this heuristic mixes two distinct
cases (one is a response to a received offer, the other interferes
in a negotiation among other players), this is not surprising. As
we are establishing upper bounds for the usefulness of these
moves, we will only be looking at heuristic 3 in the following.
Figure 6 shows the effectiveness of blocking trades when
the persuading agent has an unlimited number of moves at his
disposal where the resources are blocked until the end of the
game, as well as the more realistic case when he can make 8
blocking moves where the offerer is blocked from asking for
Fig. 6. Effects of blocking moves (using heuristic 3).
the same resources for the duration of 1 turn. We found this
length to be most effective and did not find systematic effects
when the persuading agent could only make 4 blocking moves
or when the resources were blocked for 4 turns.
The results for the more realistic agent having 8 moves
lasting 1 turn again show that the best moment to make these
moves depends on how far the game has progressed as well as
the number of moves available. Considering that an unlimited
agent makes ca. 30 blocking moves, being restricted to 8 moves
is a severe limitation, for which 6 VPs actually seems to be not
a good time to start making these moves.
The number of trades and resources received when the
agent has an unlimited number of blocking moves available
and starts to make these moves from the start of the game are
given in Table I. If he starts to make blocking moves at 8 VPs,
the advantage shrinks to 14.20 vs. 13.81 trades for the baseline
agents (t > 5.1) and 19.16 vs. 18.60 resources (t > 5.0). If the
agent is limited to 8 moves and a block length of 1 turn, at 1 VP
he makes 14.39 trades vs. 13.19 (t > 16) and receives 19.41
vs. 17.78 resources by trade (t > 15.5), which for starting at
8 VPs shrinks to 14.21 vs. 13.84 trades (t > 5.3) yielding him
19.15 vs. 18.62 resources (t > 5.3).
VIII. MORE TRADES: FORCE-ACCEPT MOVES
Rather than preventing other players from getting re-
sources, a player also benefits from getting more of the trades
he wants. We modelled this with force-accept moves that
compel an opponent to make the trade provided it is possible
(i.e., he has the necessary resources to execute the trade).
Figure 7 shows how the win rate of the persuading agent
changes depending on the number of force-accept moves he
has available and the point in time when he makes them.
Clearly, the more force-accept moves, the better! Like em-
bargoes, these moves are most effective when a leader has
around 7 VPs. But in contrast to embargoes, they do not
depend so much on the stage of the game: they provide
significant advantages for the 8 VP agent and, overall, the other
agents significantly improve their win rates with fewer moves.
Furthermore, the improvements in win rate are slightly larger
than for trade embargoes as well as for blocking moves.
Fig. 7. Effects of force-accept moves.
Fig. 8. Number of force-accept moves actually made, depending on how
many moves he can make.
Just like embargoes and blocking moves, the later in the
game the persuading agent starts making force-accept moves,
the fewer such moves he makes; see Figure 8. Also like the
other move types, force-accept moves are most efficient (in
terms of boosting one’s chances to win) for the 7 VP agent.
Looking at the persuading agents’ biggest improvements,
i.e. when they have 8 moves available, the 4 VP agent makes
18.04 trades (vs. 15.76 for the baseline agent; t > 27.8) and
receives 22.80 resources by trade (vs. 21.48; t > 11.6). Again,
the 7 VP agent achieves a bigger improvement in win rate with
a slightly smaller increase in trades (17.54 vs. 15.45; t > 23.9)
and more resources received (22.43 vs. 21.00; t > 10.7). Thus
once again, the timing is crucial.
If the agent makes a force-accept move without considering
whether the trade is actually possible (e.g., does the trade
partner have the required resources?), the trade may not
happen, and he wastes one of the moves at his disposal. In
[6] we showed that agents with an accurate belief model of
what resources their opponents have are more successful. We,
therefore made these moves more targeted: the agent only
makes a (valuable) force-accept move if he believes that the
other agent has the resources to make the trade.
Fig. 9. Win rate and number of force-accept moves made. The number of
trade embargoes enacted is always between 0.99 and 1.0.
While this doesn’t affect the win rate, the persuading
agent uses slightly fewer persuasion moves with the biggest
difference being 0.40 for the 7 VP agent with 8 available
moves. (As these agents do not play against each other directly,
we cannot present any statistics.) This further supports what
we already found and reported in [6], namely that the agents’
standard belief model is quite accurate.
IX. A SUPER-PERSUADER: EMBARGOES &
FORCE-ACCEPT
As we are looking for upper bounds of the usefulness of
persuasion moves, we gave the persuading agent the ability
to make embargo and force-accept moves; see Figure 9. This
agent achieves a win rate of more than 0.38. Thus, despite
all the advantages of persuading, the non-persuading agents
still win about 60% of the games! Together with the results
we presented in [6], where an agent that didn’t trade at all
had a win rate of 0.127 and one not making any trade offers
(but accepting other players’ offers) had a win rate of 0.162,
this again shows that the quality of the negotiation and trading
strategies in Settlers can only increase or decrease an agent’s
win rate up to a certain point: much of the game is due to
chance and agents can always trade with the bank or a port.
The 1 VP agent manages to conclude 35.23 vs. 16.22 trades
(t > 84.2) to receive 38.63 vs. 22.44 resources (t > 58.9); and
even the 9 VP agent gets 12.57 vs. 9.10 trades (t > 41.3) and
16.70 vs. 12.36 resources (t > 38.8).
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we showed in a proof by demonstration that
one can rapidly obtain a decent symbolic model of persuasion
in a complex game, where a player’s own preferences over the
outcomes of negotiation are incomplete, uncertain, and dy-
namic. Success critically depends on empirical data via game
simulations, which in turn guides the design and development
of heuristic strategies that improve the player’s chances of
winning. Here, we focussed on a specific benefit/cost ratio of
persuasion tactics: at what stage in the (complex) game would
successfully persuading an agent impact one’s chances to win
the most? This is a critical question in scenarios where the
cognitive effort of identifying a successful persuasion move
itself carries risks (e.g., the risk of ‘losing out’ while making
such calculations to another player that changes the course of
the negotiation).
We showed how this empirical approach works in the
domain of Settlers. In addition, some specific lessons can be
learned for this particular domain, some of which are far from
obvious a priori. For instance, our results reveal a tipping point
in the game when the leading player has 7 VPs: at this point
it’s relatively easy to change the course of the game, but once
this is achieved it is increasingly hard for opponents to change
it further! The results also suggest that MT type moves benefit
the persuading agent slightly more than FOT type moves.
Next, we will empirically investigate persuasion strategies
in complex games in contexts where receivers are less gullible,
i.e., which persuasion move is most likely to convince a player
of a particular type to comply and so change his behaviour?
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